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Gateway Widens Doorway
to Inposmg Unfair Binding
Arbitration on Consumers
0""i

by Jean R. Sternlight

en Rich and Enza Hill
opened the boxes to their
W
new Gateway 10th AnniW
versary computer system,
they had no idea they were trading
their right to ajury trial for binding arbitration. Nonetheless, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
because the boxes contained a 'Standard Terms and ConditionsAgreement
including an arbitration clause, the
Hills waived their right to sue Gateway
in court when they failed to return the
computer within 30 days.' Instead, the.
Hills could only file a claim against
Gateway in arbitration, and pay fees
totaling at least $2,000 to get there.2
Hill v. Gateway,3 is but the most extreme example of a series of court decisions that allow large companies to
impose potentially unfair binding arbitration agreements on unwitting consumers. When a California bank sent
its customers an envelope stuffer announcing that all future claims against
the bank must be arbitrated rather
than litigated, thereby precluding such
consumers from having their claims
heard by ajury, a California state court
upheld the clause.4 At least one Florida
bank, First Union, has similarly sent
their customers mailings announcing in
small print that all future disputes with

the bank must be arbitrated rather
than litigated.5 In a less extreme case,
Florida's Fifth District Court ofAppeal
held that consumers who purchased
pest extermination services were required to arbitrate not only contractial
disputes but also personal injury claims
that allegedly resulted from the extermination, where they signed an arbitration clause as part of the contract,6
In the health care context, the Utah
Supreme Court, in Sosa v. Paulos,2
found that a doctor could require a patient to arbitrate any future medical
malpractice complaint before a panel of
specialists in the doctor's own field because the patient signed an arbitration
clause among a number of other documents just a few minutes before she
went into surgery,
The Gateway decision is more striking than these and many other pro-arbitration cases because the Hills literally had no cnance to escape the
arbitration clause other than by making the heroic effort of returning their
new computer. Realistically, they had
no chance to even learn of the existence
of the arbitration clause before the computer was ordered, paid for, and delivered. While the Seventh Circuit implied
potential buyers might learn about
Gateway's arbitration program through
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advertisements, the Gateway web page,
or conversations with Gateway personnel, these options are illusory. Neither
the advertisements' nor the web page
made any mention of arbitration.10 Further, even had the Hills somehow had
the prescience to ask a salesperson
about arbitration," it is not at all clear
they could have obtained a copy of the
clause.u Even once the computer was
delivered it is by no means clear that a
typical consumer would have noticed or
understood the arbitration clause contained on page 3, paragraph 10 of the
statement of terms document, which
was packed together with the computer,
monitor, keyboard, lots ofsoftware, and
multiple sets of instructions.
States' statutory attempts to protect
their consumers from unfair arbitration
clauses have been largely unsuccessful
because courts have found that state
laws that single out arbitration contracts for more hostile treatment than
other contracts are preempted by the
FederalArbitrationAct,U as long as the
contract involves interstate commerce. 14 For example, the Supreme
Court held preempted a Montana statute requiring adequate notice of an arbitration provision contained in a contract," as well as an Alabama statute
entirely prohibiting pro-dispute arbi-
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tration agreements. 6 In Securities In.
dustryAss'n v.Lewis, 7 the district court
held preempted a Florida statute requiring that parties to securities arbitration agreements be provided the op.
tion of presenting their claims before a
nonindustry arbitration panel.'
The outcome in Gateway, however, is
questionable on federal statutory, common law, and constitutional grounds. 2'
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First, the Magnuson-MossAct, -passed
in 1974 'Lo improve the aaeqtiacy of
information available to consumers,
[and] prevent deception,"" provides
that consumers cannot, prior to their
assertion of a claim, be deprived of their
right to sue merchants in court. While
the Act allows merchants to establish
informal dispute settlement procedures," the Act and the accompanying
regulations and legislative history imply that these procedures must be nonbinding.P In comments issued together
with the regulations the FTC explicitly
rebutted claims of some industry reresentatives that warrantors ought, in
advance of a dispute, be allowed to require consumers to resort to binding
arbitration. It stated:
The Rule does not allow ior this for two reasons. First.... Congressional intent was
that Section 110 Mechanisms not be legally
binding. Second, even if binding Mechanisms were contemplated by Section 110 of
the Act, the Commission is not prepared, at
this point in time, to develop guidelines for
a system in which consumers would commit themselves, at the time of product purchase, to resolve afiy difficulties in a binding, but nonjudicial proceeding. The
Commission is not now convinced that any
guidelines which it set out could ensure sufficient protection for consumers against
warrantors, even if the Congressional report had uot made clear, as it did, that it
wished for such mechanisms to not be binding."2
While the agency commentary accompanying the MagnusGn-Moss Warranty
Act regulations observes that a warrantor may offer consumers the option of
binding arbitration, once a dispute has
arisen,' the regulations prohibit warrantors from mandating binding arbitration prior
to the occurrence of the
2
dispute.
Gateway is also questionable as a
matter of contract law. While it is clear
that buyers and seller entered a contract regarding purchase and sale ofthe
computer, that contract did not necessarily include an arbitration provision.
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the
majority, essentially concluded that a
contract for arbitration was formed because the buyers accepted delivery of
the computer and then failed to return
it within 30 days. Yet, pursuant to the
more traditional contract analysis offered by the buyers, the contract was
formed when, by accepting payment,
faxing a confirmation, and shipping the
computer, Gateway accepted the purchase offer made by the Hills over the
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phone. Buyers argue that because their
offer did not contain an arbit-ition
clause, the supplemental terms contained'in the box were simply a proposal for additional or modifying terms
which the buyers did not accept.25 Uniform Commercial Code §2-207 governs
such situations." Where, as in Gateway,
the contract was not between two mferchants, §2-207 provides that if a party
accepts a contract but also states different or additional terms than were
offered, those terms are regarded as
mere "proposals for addition" and not
hodifications" to the contract.30 Here,
because the contract was entered between consumers and merchant prior
to the shipment of the computer, it
would seem that the Hills should not
be bound by the proposal for an arbitration clause."
Third, although courts have generally rejected attempts to challenge private arbitration agreements on constitutional grounds, finding a lack of state
action and/or waiver of such claims,2
commentators are increasingly raising
the possibility of such an argument. 3
The, state often throws its weight behind private arbitration by interpreting asserted agreements broadly to favor arbitration over litigation.U Where
courts rr- - on such a preference in their
interpre~ation of an arbitration agreement the court arguably engages in
state action that calL ito play constitutional protections Given the existence of state action, enforcing an unfair mandatory binding arbitration
agreement that was not knowingly and
voluntarily accepted by the consumer"
will often violate the Seventh Amendment right .) a jury trial for claims
brought at common law in federal
court.Y If tl', state participates in enforcing such a waiver, it also potentially
acts unconstitutionally in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendments guaran.
tep of due process" and Article III's
guarantee of the riZiht to present a
claim to a federal court judge."
Finally, Gateway is unwise as a matter of policy. Judge Easterbrook basei
his conclusion that "[piractical considerations support allowing vendors to
enclose the full legal terms with their
products," on a "straw man," asserting
that requiring cashiers to read such
terms over the phone would simply
"anesthetize" or anger potential customers." This analysis is flawed because it fails to consider alternative
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ways to regulate dealer conduct and
because it ignores the potential significance of allowing companies to require
consumers to trade their litigation
rights for arbitration. Companies can
use such clauses not only to take away
a consumer-friendly jury but also to
force consumers to bring claims in a
distant and thus expensive forum, to
impose high extra arbitration costs, to
deny consumers needed discovery, to
deprive consumers of recovery for punitive damages, and to prevent consumers from using the economical class action procedures that would be available
in court." The Gateway provision itself
was unfair in some of these ways. It
required that the dispute would be
heard under International Chamber of
Commerce rules Which demand the filing party to pay at least $2,000 for the
services of the ICC and its arbitrator.
What kind of sense would it make for a
consumer with a dispute over a $4,000
computer to pay half that amount in
arbitration fees alone?' 2 The clause also
required all claims to be brought in
Chicago, which would certainly be quite
expensive for those customers who,
unlike the Hills, did not live in Chicage." Finally, the ICC rules make no
provision for discovery, which could well
prove crucial to a consumer's claim of
fraud or defect.
Assuming that the imposition of an
arbitration clause may have a significant impact on consumers, Gateway
unreasonably shifts to consumers both
the search costs of ascertaining the existence of such a clause and the return
cost of avoiding such a clause. While it
might not make sense to require cashiers to read extensive terms to customers, surely it would not be unreasonable to require the company to alert
customers to the existence of such an
important clause. Gateway might easily have done so in any number ofways:
by noting the existence of the arbitration clause in its advertisements where
it already mentioned the limited warranty; by requiring its cashiers to mention the arbitation clause and then
offering to read it or send it upon the
customer's request; or by at least including mention of the clause on the
written confirmation that the company
sent to its customers prior to shipment
of the computer." While none of these
methods would guarantee that customers were not unfairly and unwittingly
deprived of their right to litigate dis-

putes in court, such methods would at
least decrease the likelihood of such an
outcome. It is simply wrong-to rest
waiver of a constitutional right on the
assumption that a consumer would
both read in detail all of the documents
enclosed with a new computer and then
take the dramatic and expensive step
of returning the brand new computer
to its shipper." Moreover, given the realities of consumer behavior, it would
be preferable to flatly prohibit merchants from requiring consumers to
waive their litigation rights in favor of
binding arbitration. At a minimum
merchants should be barred from imposing arbitration clauses that are unfair.
The Gateway arbitration clause was
not as bad for consumers as it might
have been. At least the clause didnot,
as some clauses do, require disputes to
be heard by biased decision makers"
rior limit the consumers' rights to punitive damages.' 7 However, Gateway
gives companies virtually free rein to
develop their own unfair clauses and
impose them after the fact on unwitting consumers. Either courts or the
Congress should take steps quickly to
protect consumers from such practices.
We should not allow foxes to design the
chickens' coop. 0
1Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir
1997) (rehearing denied). The arbitration
clause was on page 3, paragraph 10 of the
standard terms document, and the clause
was not highlighted nor displayed in large
print. (Clause on fie with auhor).
2The arbitration clause provided that arbitration would be governed by the International Chamber of Commerce Rules ofArbitration. These rules, normally applied to
large transactions between companies located in different countries, require the
party filing a dispute for up to $50,000 to
pay administrative expenses of $2,000. The
rules further provide that the arbitrator's
fee in such cases shall be at least $2,000 up
to a maximum of 15 percent of the value of
the claim. While these fees can apparently
be split between the parties, they do not
include additional costs a party must generally pay such as for an attorney or for
travel.
3 105 F.3d 1147.
4 Badie v. Bank of America, 1994 WL
660730 (Cal. App. Dept Super. Ct. 1994).
3Barry Meier, In Fine Pri,.t, Customers
Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. Times, March 10,
1997, at 1.
42rminixInternatlonalCo. u. Ponzlo, 693
So. 2d 104 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1997). Cf.
2rminixInternationalCo. v.Michaels, 688
So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996) (customers who signed standard agreement calling
for arbitration in connection with purchase
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of pest extermination services were not required to arbitrate personal injury claims
relating to pest extermination). The Florida
Supreme Court has observed that "[ulnder
Florida law ... arbitration is a favored
means of dispute resolution and courts indulge every reasonable presumption to uphold proceedings resulting in an award.*Roe
v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 533 So. 2d
279 (Fla. 1988).
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).
'Id. at3K9. The Utah Supreme Court held
that the rJuse would be enforceable only if
the evidence supported the doctor's claim
that the patient was given a copy of the
agreement when she left the hospital. In so
holding the court emphasized the fact that
the patient had 14 days within which to revoke the clause had she decided sh did not
wish to be bound by its terms. Nonetheless,
it is probably a very rare patient who, upon
returning home from surgery, would read
through all the papers she signed and take
the step of revoking her agreement to arbitration. Other aiguably unfair decisions include Cohen v. Wedbish, Noble, Cooke, Inc.,
841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988) (securities customers held bound by arbitration clause although plaintiffs claimed brokerage misled
them by failing to inform them of the meaning and effect of the clause); DeGaetanou.
Smith Barney, Inc., 1996 WL 44226
(S.D.N.Y 1996) (employee held bound by
arbitration provision even though she
signed only a general agreement setting out
"principles of employment" and was not actually provided with a copy of the arbitration agreement); McCarthy u. Providential
Corp., 1994 US. Dist. LEXIS 10122 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (senior citizen homeowners held
bound by arbitration clause contained
within vast array of loan documents provided at closing).
I Although the advertisement did mention
a limited warranty, the purchasers had no
reason to believe that the warranty would
be used to deprive them of rights rather than
to provide them with protections should the
product turn out to be defective.
10Of course, even if the web page had mentioned such a clause many computer customers might well not have a computer that
would allow them to peruse the web page
in the first place.
1 In all likelihood, few customers would
have been focusing on the presence or absence of an arbitration clause. Rather, they
would probably have been thinking about
the $4,000 they, }ere spending on the computer system, about all of the pleasure and
time savings they would get from their new
computer, andperhaps about the potential
difficulties they would face in setting up the
new system.
1 This author's persistent attempts to procure a copy of the arbitration provision from
Gateway sales a.d customer service representatives did not prove productive.
Gateway's failure to provide this information promptly would seem to violate the
Magnuson-Mcss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act. 15 U.S.C.
§2302; 16 C.F.R. §§701.3, 702.3,703.2 (written warranty shall include information
about any informal dispute resolution pro-

cedure and shall promptly be made available to any consumer upon request).
0 9 U.S.C. §§1 et seq.
" Although states' protective legislation
would apply in the absence of interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court has defined
the term broadly to cover the full range of
Congress' authority to regulate all "c&mmerce in fact." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
15Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 116
S.CL 1652 (1996).
'$AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265 (1995).
1'751 F. Supp. 205 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
Is The statute at issue was FLA. STAT.
§517.122, which provides that where securities brokers require their customers to
arbitrate claims they must provide the customers "the option of having arbitration
before and pursuant to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association or other
independent non-industry arbitration forum
as well as any industry forum."
" Plaintiffs apparently did not present to
the court the Magnuson-Moss or constitutional arguments discussed in this article,
and also did not make all of the contract
law arguments set out here.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§2301 et seq.
2115 U.S.C. §2302(a).
2 15 U.S.C. §2310(aX3).
2" The statute provides that the informal
dispute resolution procedure must comply
with regulations adopted by the Federal

Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. §2310(aX2),
and that the consumer may pursue a legal
remedy only after resorting to the appropriate internal procedure. 15 U.S.C.
§2310(a). The FTC rules explicitly state that
"decisions of the [informal dispute] mechanism shall not be legally binding on any
person." ,16C.F.R. §703.5(j). See also 16
C.F.R. §703.5(g) (consumer who is dissatisfied with informal decision may pursue legal remedies). The legislative history of the
statute is clear that the informal dispute
procedures were envisioned as a prerequisite rather than a substitute for court remedies. Remarks of Congressman Moss, 119
Cong. Rec. 972 (Jan. 12, 1973); H.R. Rep.
93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 41 reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7723. See generally Wilson v.Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954
F. Supp. 1530 (M.). Ala. 1997) (given restrictions of Magnuson-Moss, mobile home
manufacturer may not compel consumer to
arbitrate claims against manufacturer
based on arbitration agreement between
consumer and retailer).
2 40 Fed. Reg. 60168, 60210 (1975). See
also id.at 60211 ("reference within the written warranty to any binding, non-judiCial
remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the
Act').
2540 Fed. Reg. 60168, 60211 (1975).
2 16 C.F.R. §703.5(j). Even assuming for
the sake of argument the validity of a predispute agreement to binding arbitration of
a consumer claim, the FTC rules prohibit

companies from using ADR mechanisms
that are unfair in certain ways. Companies
cannot charge consumers any fee for use of
the mechanism, 16 C.F.R. §703.3(a), nor
have the disputes decided by persons who
are employed by the company for any purpose other than to resolve disputes. 16
C.F.R. §703.4(a)(1). The company is also
supposed to ensure that the decision maker
is sufficiently "insulated" from the warrantor, for example in terms of personnel decisions, that the decision will not be biased.
16 C.F?. §703.3(b). The clause at issue in
Gateway is impermissible because the ICC
rules require consumers to share the arbitration fees and costs.
2While
the court is not explicit as to how
the contract was formed, it implies that the
vendor was the offeror and the buyer the
offeree. 105 F.3d at 1148-49. The analysis
drew from the Seventh Circuit's earlier decidion in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996), holding that a software
purchaser was bound by a license agreement
where the box mentioned that the software
was governed by a license and where the
license was provided in the manual and
appeared on a user's srreen every time the
program was run. Gateway is a more extreme case than ProCD in at least two respects. First, the Gateway customers received no notification at all; prior to delivery,
that they would be subject to an arbitration
clause. Second, an arbitration cla,,se is a
waiver of constitutional rights, as 'posed
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to a waiver of mere economic interests.
TuiANE L. Rv. (Nov. 1997) (arguing that
2 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-3294,
reliance on state preference for arbitraResponsive Brief of Appellees at 13-14 (on tion over litigation gives rise to state acfile with author).
tion, and that unknowing waivers do not
29 The Gateway court observed that U.C.C.
meet constitutional standards). Cf. Shelley
§2-207 is irrelevant where there is only one v. Kraemer,334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court
form, and not a "battle of the forms" between violated equal protection clause by grantthe two parties, 105 F.2d at 1150, but did ing injunctive relief to a litigant seeking
not expressly state whether or how the pro- to enforce a privately negotiated racially
vision applied to the computer sale. How- restrictive covenant).
ever, by its terms the section does seem to 3 E.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
apply to this situation where the shipper v. Mercury Constr.,460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
accepted the buyer's offer and then submit- ("Questions of arbitrability must be adted additional terms. Further, even if U.C.C. dressed with a healthy regard for the fed§2-207 is in fact irrelevant it would seem eral policy favoring arbitration ....
The
that the buyers never accepted the arbitra- Arbitration Act establishes that, as a mattion clause. It has long been established that ter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
mere silence is not sufficient to accept a con- scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
tract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts in favor of arbitration, whether the prob§69 provides, in relevant part, that silence lem at hand is the construction of the condoes not constitute acceptance except tract language itself or an allegation of
"[w]here the offeror has stated or given the waiver, delay, or a like defense to
offeree reason to understand that assent arbitrability.").
may be manifested by silence or inaction, 3 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Reand the offeree in remaining silent and in- thinking the Constitutionalityof the Suactive intends to accept the offer ... [orJ preme Court's Preferencefor BindingArbi[w]here because of previous dealings or oth- tration:A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
erwise, it is reasonable that the offeree SeparationofPowers andDue ProcessConshould notify the offeror if he does not in- cerns, forthcoming 72 TuLANE L. Rlv. (Nov.
tend to accept." Neither exception applies 1997).
in this instance.
3 While constitutional rights are subject
30Even where the contract is between mer- to waiver, courts generally "indulge every
chants, terms that "materially alter" the reasonable presumption against waiver."
original offer do not automatically become Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,393
part of the contract. Arbitration clauses (1937). Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
have been held to constitute material terms (1972), held that a waiver of procedural due
that may not be incorporated absent affir- process rights must be clear, and further
mative assent, even against merchants. implied that even a clear waiver might be
E.g., Diskin v. J.P Stevens & Co., 836 F.2d struck down on grounds of involuntariness.
47,50-51 (1st Cir. 1987). The new terms also Applying these standards, the Gateway
do not modify a contract between merchants computer purchasers and most other conif the offer expressly limited acceptance to sumers should not be found to have waived
the terms of the offer or if notification of their constitutional rights to ajury trial, due
objection to the new terms was previously process, and an Article ITT judge. See genergiven or is given within a reasonable time ally Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 35,
after notice of them is received. U.C.C. §2- at 53-82.
207.
1 Many state constitutions provide simi31 The "Standard Terms and Conditions"
lar rights for claims brought in state court.
agreement enclosed with the computer did However, courts might find that the FAA
include a statement that by keeping the preempts such state constitutional provicomputer the customers agreed to be bound sions.
by the terms. However, pursuant to the 3 Sternlight,Rethinking, supranote 35, at
U.C.C. and standard contract law this pre- 96-118.Although not all binding arbitration
liminary statement itself should not have clauses would likely be found to violate due
been binding on the Hills.
process, those that were unfair or biased
32 E.g., Terminix International Co. v. would do so.
Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104,108 (Fla. 5th D.C.A.
SId. at 93-96. The Article III claim could
1997) ("The short answer to these [consti- be raised only by those litigants who would
tutional] arguments is that the plaintiffs have had a right to sue in federal court.
waived these rights by consenting to arbi0 105 F.3d at 1149.
trate disputes 'arising out of ... the agree- 41 See generallyJean R. Steralight, Pana.
ment'). See also FDIC v. Air Florida, 822 cea or Corporate Tool: Debunking the SuF.2d 833, 833 (9th Cir. 1986) (rejecting chal- preme Court's Preference for Binding Arbi.
lenge to constitutionality of arbitration tration,74 WAsH. U.L.Q. 637,674-697 (1996)
based on lack of state action).
(arguing that companies can use binding ar3 E.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Jus- bitration to secure strategic advantages over
tice:Toward a State Action Theory ofADR, consumers, employees, and franchisees).
85 CAL. L. REv. 577 (1997) (arguing that 12 The arbitration fee is over and above any
role of state courts in compelling arbitra- attorneys' fees and travel costs the customer
tion and confirming arbitral results is suf- must also pay. At least in litigation thejudge
ficient to give rise to state action); Jean is free.
R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitution- 4 By contrast, had the consumers been
ality of the Supreme Court'sPreferencefor able to bring a lawsuit they would have been
Binding Arbitration:A FreshAssessment permitted to bring it in any jurisdiction
of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers and where they could secure personal jurisdicDue Process Concerns, forthcoming 72 tion over Gateway.
16 THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNAL/NOVUMBER 1997
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"Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 96-3294,
Responsive Brief of Appellees at 7 (discussing Gateway shipping procedures) (on file
with author).
46 Because most consumers will believe
it is statistically unlikely they would need
to sue Gateway, they will tend to undervalue the cost imposed by the arbitration
clause and will not likely return the computer they have so eagerly awaited.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract,47 STAN.
L. Ray. 211,217 (1995).See alsoSternlight,
Panacea,supra note 41, at 688-693 (critiquing assumption of consumer rationality).
15 In theory, both the FAA, 9 U.S.C.
§10(a)(2) and the Magnuson-Moss Act
regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§703.3 & 703.4,
prohibit the use of biased arbitrators.
However, in practice courts have often refused to credit consumers' claims of bias.
E.g., Sosa u. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah
1996) (refusing to strike arbitration clause
on ground that alleged medical malpractice victim was required to present claim
to doctors in defendant's specialty area).
47 Courts have sometimes struck
such
clauses as in violation of an underlying federal statute. E.g., Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO
Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994) (arbitration clause which, interalia,precluded
recovery of punitive damages held void under federal Petroleum Management Protection Act).
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MEMBER BENEFITS
Fall 1997

Program Update Featuring:
-Office Depot Business Services Division offers savings from 40% to 80% off
products listed in the program catalog. In addition, a list of 150 of the most commonly used
"commodity office products" has been assembled and items included are offered to Florida Bar
members at an even lower price. Add up to fifty items suited to the unique needs of your practice
to this list and receive the same negotiated percentage savings on your own customized products
list. Free next day delivery is included. For unanticipated and/or after hour purchases, an in-store
purchasing card is provided.
To take advantage of these savings, complete the Office Depot application provided as an insert in
the November 1 issue of The Florida Bar News and fax to Carole Thompson, Office Depot, 1-800816-3139. Upon approval of your account, you will be contacted by an Office Depot account
executive to complete the set up process and familiarize you with this exciting new program for
Florida Bar members.

*WorldCom Long Distance Telephone Service provides members a cost-effective
telecommunications service for home and/or businesses of all sizes. For information on home
service, call 1-888-876-9869. The business service number to call is 1-800-539-2000.

-Other Programs Available to Members
Association Insurance Programs
Court and Surety Bonds
Professional Liability Insurance
Car Rentals

Business PlanningConcepts,Inc.
JurisCo
FLMIC
Alamo
#93718
Avis
#A421600
Hertz
#152030
National
#5650262
Computerized Legal Research
Lexis -Nexis Advantage
Credit Card Program
MBNA
Document Assembly System
Automated Leg Sys "ProDoc"
Express Shipping
Airborne Express
#N82
Eyecare
Lens Express
#FLBAR
Magazine Subscriptions
SubscriptionServices
Wireless Communications Products Cellular Works

800-282-8626
800-274-2663
800-633-6458
800-354-2322
800-331-1212
800-654-2200
800-227-7368
800-356-6548
800-457-3714
800-759-5418
800-443-5228
800-666-5367
800-289-6247
800-235-5967

Member Benefits. The Florida Bar, 650 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-2300

HeinOnline -- 71 Fla. B.J. 17 1997

